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O VERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE CASE STUDIES

OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE CASE STUDIES—LESSONS FOR
EDUCATION POLICY FORMATION
by David R. Evans, Richard Sack and Christopher P. Shaw

INTRODUCTION
Successful education reform in Africa is dependent on the quality of the underlying education
policy. DAE’s work has been guided by this awareness since its inception, and it emerged as a powerful
lesson from consultations on
implementation at the previBox 1. Case studies on Education Policy Formation
ous Biennial meeting, held in
Angers, France in October
In the past five years, DAE, with the support and collaboration of USAID,
1993. Beginning in 1990,
has sponsored case studies on Education Policy Formation in ten African
DAE sponsored a series of
countries. The cases are:
case studies on education
BENIN*
BOTSWANA
policy formation in five counGHANA*
GUINEA*
tries in Africa.2 These studies
MALI
MAURITIUS*
formed the basis for a series
MOZAMBIQUE*
SENEGAL
TANZANIA
UGANDA*
of technical review meetings
and ultimately a decision to
*Cases reported in full in this publication and commissioned for the Tours
undertake a second set of case
Biennial Meeting
studies, this time written
solely by authors from the
concerned countries. Together, these efforts have produced ten cases from sub-Saharan Africa which
constitute a substantial knowledge base. The cumulative African experience in education policy formation, reflected in these cases and in this summary analysis, provide the background for the discussions at
DAE’s Biennial Plenary.
The DAE Biennial meeting in Angers in 1993 recognized the importance of having in place “longterm education sector development strategies” which presume a clearly articulated and fully supported
education policy framework for the country. During that meeting and subsequently, Ministers of Education and funding agencies alike increasingly became concerned with the “how to” questions of education
policy formation. In addressing these questions two facts emerged: (i) recognition that a number of
African countries had a history of education policy formulation from which lessons could be learned.
That realization led to the case studies which formed the basis of the discussions at the 1995 DAE
Biennial; (ii) education policy formation was of sufficient importance and immediacy to be a suitable
theme for the 1995 Tours Biennial meeting. As a result, it appeared that lessons and methodological
guidelines can be extracted from the case studies which would assist all African countries in creating or
improving their national education policy structure.
The importance of countries having a sound sector policy which articulates a plan and priorities
for the education sector was reinforced by the comments of the keynote speaker at Tours, Mr. Per Grimstad,
Director-General of NORAD. He reported on his agency’s new approach to development which emphasizes
partnership rather than dependency. This requires both NORAD and African governments to enter into
responsible business relationships for the financing of development activities. Each partner has
contractually defined responsibilities and is accountable for them to the other partner. Projects are defined
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and implemented by the government, not NORAD which, however, wants to see that the project is based
on sector policy which has approval from the Ministry of Finance and widespread support within the
sector. According to Mr. Grimstad, this approach is an alternative designed to overcome the weaknesses
of past development relationships.
One of the central lessons to emerge from the case studies is the diversity of experience in African
countries. Past discussions about policy formation have focussed almost exclusively on the content of
policy, such as EFA, efficiency, or girls’ access—while the processes of policy formation have been little
analyzed or discussed. With the worldwide movement towards more active involvement of civil society
in governance and policy, along with decentralization, governments are seeking to learn lessons from
each another about policy processes as well as content. Approaches to education policy formation vary
widely between countries depending on their colonial history and hence their inherited patterns of
interaction between civil society and the state. Equally clear is the existence of windows of opportunity
which depend on both internal political and economic conditions and on external patterns of relationships
with the funding agencies and international economic forces. Running through all the cases are two
central themes: the need for publicly stated education policies which are understood and supported by
both government and civil society, and the importance of participation by the diverse parts of society that
will be affected by the policies.
This paper will first take a brief excursion into how social scientists have viewed the processes
of policy making, then—in order to facilitate discussion of the case studies and the diversity of experience
expressed at meeting in Tours—present a set of elements which are part of many policy formation
experiences. Subsequent sections of this paper will examine a series of issues which emerged from the
analysis of African national experiences. The final section will summarize the dialogue and findings of
the Biennial meeting in Tours.

SYSTEMATIC, ANALYTICAL VIEWS OF POLICY MAKING
The social science literature on policy formation shows two distinct views: the earlier, more
traditional literature tends to characterize the process as a set of stages or steps which follow a logical
order, while the more recent literature suggests that policy making is a messy, fluid process which
cannot be reduced to a simple linear model. The more traditional models are helpful in portraying a
confusing reality in an ordered way. This facilitates thinking about the components of a policy process.
However, recent field-based research, as well as the case studies sponsored by DAE, illustrate that reality
is more complex, less clearly ordered, and seldom reflects a simple application of technical rationality in
decision making.

Policy making as discrete steps and stages
The more traditional descriptions of policy formation contain some version of a “policycycle”—
a set of stages beginning with problem identification and ending with an evaluation of implemented
programs that can lead to a revised set of issues that feeds into a new cycle. A typical example of a policy
cycle—graphically shown in Box 2— would contain the following stages:
(a)

2

Identification of policy problems; setting the policy agenda.
Policy problems originate from a variety of sources: some are technical/professional—such as
planners seeking to rationalize school locations or educators concerned about content of the
curriculum; others are more political—such as parents worried about the ability of their children
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to gain access to higher levels of education or teacher unions frustrated by their terms of service;
and some come from external sources—such as when funding agencies advocate policies like
improved access of girls to basic education. When pressures are strong enough, the issue becomes
a policy problem to which the government must respond and the problem becomes part of the
policy agenda. However, there is a difference between identifying issues, which can come from
many different sources, and getting them onto the policy agenda. This requires visibility for the
issue and significant levels of interest from powerful forces in the government, in civil society,
or from the funding agencies.
(b)

Formulation and assessment of policy options.
Once issues are identified and have become part of the policy agenda, the rational planning
approach indicates that alternative solutions should be drawn up and evaluated. All too often,
this step is incomplete and only one policy response is investigated and prepared in detail, thus
reducing the options. However, when this stage is undertaken rigorously, several technically
sound, economically feasible, and politically practical options are set forth and compared. Making
judgements about the desirability of the various trade-offs involved in different options is the
responsibility of the political and educational leadership of the country.

(c)

Adoption of particular policy options.
This stage requires a decision-making process for the selection of policy options to be
implemented. Various approaches are used to formalize these decisions. In Anglophone Africa,
where there is a history of education commissions, governments often take the most recent policy
commission report and respond with a White Paper indicating which recommendations will be
accepted either in part or in full. In Francophone countries, there is a practice of Etats Généraux
that provide recommendations to be selectively implemented by Ministries of Education or sent
to parliament for action.

(d)

Implementation of policies.
This includes the translation of policy options into specific strategies for carrying out the policy.
Strategies in turn are converted into plans with actions, time lines, and resources. The choice of
strategies is subject to local conditions and a variety of constraints, including resource availability
and managerial capacity. Since policies interact with local realities and are adjusted accordingly,
this is actually an ongoing part of the policy formation process. Indeed, policy as implemented
and experienced is the final definition of what a policy actually is. How education programs are
actually implemented was the subject of the 1993 meeting in Angers, France.3

(e)

Evaluation of policy impact.
Evaluation of policies has two components: first, collecting information to measure the effect, if
any, the policy has had on education; and, second, when the desired impact did not occur, assessing
the causes of the “deviant” results. Assessing the impact of a change requires baseline data,
established prior to policy implementation; it also requires a capacity to collect information
which will provide an appropriate indicators of policy impact.

(f)

Adjustment and beginning of new policy cycle.
This step is essentially identical to the first stage discussed in this section—identification of
policy issues. If policies are found to be less effective than expected, then a judgement has to be
made whether this is enough of a problem to be kept on the policy agenda. If it is, then assessment
of the causes of the problem is needed. Lack of effectiveness can come from two general sources:
•
•

inadequate capacity to implement the policy effectively, or
problems with the policy itself.
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Funding agencies have traditionally assumed that lack of implementation capacity is the problem
and sought to provide assistance in the form of projects to increase that capacity. While lack of capacity
is often a contributing factor, assessment of the policy itself may also be needed.
The “steps and stages” approach can be reconciled with the “fluid process” view by emphasizing
the unpredictability of the process. Instead of seeing these stages as rigidly sequential, each one can be
viewed as a challenge to be faced at some point in the process of policy formation and implementation.4
Nonetheless, thinking of the policy process as a logical sequence of steps can help to make sense of the
challenge, even though it does not provide fully applicable guidelines for policymakers working in real

Box 2: Schematic Diagram of a General Policy Cycle

Source: Haddad & Demsky, 1994. Page 10.

world settings. Since—as the case studies demonstrate—environmental characteristics strongly influence
every stage of the process, at any given point a country can be addressing a particular stage or even
several stages at once, without necessarily having dealt with “previous stages.”
In his presentation at Tours, Mr. Wadi Haddad, Deputy Secretary of the World Bank, argued that
the “policy cycle” (see Box 2) was an oversimplification for analytic purposes. In reality no country goes
through such a circle, rather it goes through many loops. His research showed that the most successful
policy processes started with policy actors functioning in an organization and proceeding step by step—
planning being an incremental process—adding small changes to existing policies. Policy reforms which
tried to be holistic or were too dependent onindividual actors were much more likely to fail, according to
his research.5

Policy making as a fluid process: evidence from field studies
In practice, the elements of the policy cycle do not take place as a series of discrete steps, but are
experienced as a continuously interactive process. At all stages, affected stakeholders seek to make
changes which address their concerns. In this sense, the formulation of policy options is not something
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which happens only at the beginning of the cycle, but is continuous, with important inputs being made
even after the adoption of a particular policy option. Thus even well into the implementation stage,
powerful actors can and will seek to influence the translation of policies into regulations and actions.
Policy leaders often underestimate the importance of the large numbers of mid-level bureaucrats and
school-level educators who will influence the form which policies take in practice. Failure to involve
these cadres in the policy process at an early stage may increase their resistance during implementation.
Under some circumstances, these actors can block or reverse policies when they reach local levels. A
good example is found in countries where new textbooks which have been delivered to schools are not
being used by the teachers, who feel more comfortable teaching as they have always done without texts.
The old adage about education is still valid—when the door to the classroom is closed, the teacher
controls what takes place.
Most studies of policy making and the processes by which it occurs are confined to the North
American context and have been done by mainly political scientists, sociologists and economists. Even
those studies that concentrate on developing countries make abundant reference to, and tend to draw
their conceptual frameworks from, the North American work.6
One analytical point in common to most treatments of policy making is the distinction and interplay
between information and technical analysis, on the one hand, and politics and power, on the other hand.
As Lindblom and Woodhouse put it
Thus, a deep conflict runs through common attitudes toward policy making. People want policy to be
informed and well analyzed, perhaps even correct or scientific; yet they also want policy making to be
democratic and hence necessarily an exercise of power.7

When it comes to education policy making in Africa, an analysis of the previous set of case studies points
out that
Policy recommendations for education reform therefore have two components, technical and political. Even
modest changes in education, desirable from a technical perspective, can lead to substantial unrest and even
violence if they are perceived to threaten the access to benefits of various groups in society. Change in
education requires public consensus and political acceptability to a degree not needed in other sectors.8

According to this perspective, there is no “One Way” to view the policy process. A couple of the
most prominent students of policy-making and related processes (concentrating mainly on North America)
conclude that
Deliberate, orderly steps therefore are not an accurate portrayal of how the policy process actually works.
Policy making is, instead, a complexly interactive process without beginning or end. To make sense of it
certainly requires attention to conventional governmental-political topics such as elections, elected
functionaries, bureaucrats, and interest groups. But equally or more important are the deeper forces structuring
and often distorting governmental behavior: business influence, inequality and impaired capacities for probing
social problems. These intertwine in fascinating and disturbing ways in contemporary policy making.9

In other words, given the large number and variety of factors and forces involved in policy making, “pure
rationality” should not to be expected. This is more art than science. As Porterand Hicks put it, “the
policy process is fluid, even messy, but still largely understandable.”10
Indeed, the Nobel prize recipient Herbert Simon argues that
The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared with
the size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world—or
even for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality.11
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The message here is that a certain modesty is in order when one embarks on the complex and perilous
task of policy formation.
This modesty also covers the applicability of concepts and lessons derived from the North
American context—characterized by a long tradition of decentralization and democratic openness—to
developing countries where governments tend to be more centralized and where the policy elites tend to
play a more predominant role in policy formation. Nonetheless, the concepts and analytical orientations
gained from the former are a useful starting point for looking at the processes of policy formation in
other political, social, economic and cultural contexts.

OVERVIEW OF THE SIX AFRICAN CASE STUDIES
The case studies on which this paper is based take a systematic, analytical and critical look at the
processes of educational policy formation in six African countries. These studies are written by actors
involved in, or close to, the events and processes that are the subject of their papers. Each case is different,
with the differences covering several dimensions:
(a)

Although each case study focuses on at least one policy “event”, the nature and form of that
event vary. All, however, include some form of, more or less, formal document.

(b)

The authors’ academic backgrounds and perspectives vary. Some have social science training
others are educationists; some have extensive policy experience, others are more academic; and,
of course, their relationships to the politics of their respective educational systems vary.

(c)

Coverage of implementation varies. Most of the case studies deal with the longer-term process
of policy formation, which includes the formulation (i.e., articulation and drafting) of a policy
document. The focus on policy formation means that feedback from implementation into the ongoing articulation of policy becomes part of the overall process.

Each case study is anchored to an policy formulation “event” (generally, a policy paper or
declaration, with the exception of Mozambique). In the policy formation process, documents are formulated
and become a matter of record and reference. Such documents—be they laws, government statements,
declarations, Commission reports, or White Papers—serve a function: they focus attention and become
a touchstone against which implementors can be held accountable. In varying forms, this occurs in both
open, industrial democracies—where appointed implementors are accountable to elected officials12—
and in more closed and/or less developed countries—where national education systems are dependent
on, and accountable to, external financing for their development and, even, survival.

Characterizing the cases: a descriptive overview
The table in Annex 1 provides an overview of the case studies by country and “topic”. The
“topics”, which are the major conceptual themes that emerge from the case studies, include both descriptive
and more analytical categories. Identification of these categories is derived from both the scholarly
literature on policy formation and from the case studies themselves. What follows is a synopsis of the
country case studies that follow in the subsequent chapters.
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BENIN
In 1990 Benin was the first of the new wave of African democracies, emerging from seventeen
years of a “militaro-marxist” regime that brought on its own demise through financial insolvency. The
regime became progressively incapable of paying civil service salaries and student scholarships. For a
combination of reasons, the école nouvelle that was decreed in 1975 did not succeed in its objectives of
adapting schooling to socio-economic realities of the country.13 One of the first demands made of the
new democratic regime was to hold a broad forum on education (the Etats Généraux de l’Education)
which advocated priority for quality education in order to reconstruct the country’s intellectual elites.
Beyond the Etats Généraux, however, education remained the business of the Ministry of Education
(MoE): the elected legislature paid little attention to the sector, the press and other media devoted only
periodic attention, and local communities did not become particularly activist.
Shortly before the birth of the new regime, an extensive policy analysis project was started by
UNESCO with UNDP support that produced an integrated set of studies designed to provide the knowledge
base required for sustainable policies. These studies were begun before the end of the old regime and
with no more justification than that something would have to be done and, therefore, extensive policy
analysis would be useful. Their practical impact was unpredictable: (i) the studies were used by those
attending the Etats Généraux de l’Education andprovided factual reference points to passionate debates
often dominated by interest-group politics; (ii) they provided input into the production of an official
policy statement; (iii) they were used as justification by one funding agency for a major financial
involvement in the education sector (that funding agency’s initial motivation being to support democracy,
without prior commitment to any particular sector); and (iv) they became a common and unavoidable
point of reference to all concerned with the sector. However, most of the information generated by these
studies was not widely diffused beyond MoE down to the local levels of the education system. An
important secondary outcome of this policy analysis project was its capacity building effect among staff
of MoE and other ministries who worked on the studies along with international experts. Many of these
staff have subsequently been promoted to higher level positions in their ministries.
A number of the suggested reforms are currently being implemented with financing from one
agency, in particular. One intended consequence of the policy analysis project was to promote donor
coordination. Since MoE never took the lead in this area, funding agencies largely pursued their own
inclinations. Nonetheless, by their existence and comprehensiveness, the policy studies did have a
coordinating effect.
The major message that emerges from the Benin case study is that a strong body of sector studies,
in which nationals from the Ministry played a major role, can have a number of positive consequences,
many of which can not be foreseen when the work was initially planned and undertaken.

GHANA
In 1983, the populist military regime that took power in 1981, veered away from its policies of
self-reliance and undertook extensive adjustment programs with support from the IMF and the World
Bank. Due to a combination of underfinancing, a teacher exodus, lack of statistics, and declines in
enrollment, the education system was pronounced “clinically dead” in the mid 1980s. In 1987 a wideranging education reform was promulgated. Initial reform actions concerned the post-primary level as
per proposals formulated in 1974 and piloted on a very limited scale in the late 1970s. However, given
the felt need for immediate action, the reform proposals of the mid-1980s were announced abruptly, and
developed in the absence of policy analysis by a very limited number of people.14
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The reforms were very well financed by several international agencies and implemented in a
climate of institutional instability within the sector. Results have been disappointing, with all indicators
suggesting that little learning is happening in the schools, even after seven years of reform implementation.
Enrollments increased, but barely enough to keep up with population growth, and retention rates declined.
More positively, the institutional base for planning and policy formation based on good statistical
information was created.
The major message that emerges from this study is that, although strong, authoritarianleadership
can be quite effective in getting a reform off the ground, it is not sufficient to make it work and provide
tangible results. Lack of a solid knowledge base, no consultation during the preparatory period, an
authoritarian approach to reform implementation, and failure to improve learning outcomes all resulted
in a thorough reevaluation of the reform six years after its inception. This evaluation provided the basis
of a new cycle of policy reforms.

GUINEA
In a context of adjustment financed by several funding agencies (French, USAID, IMF, World
Bank, and others), a policy declaration was approved in 1989 that provided the basis for a multi-agency
financed education sector adjustment program. The document was designed as a guidepost for future
directions: it is precise about sector objectives and priorities, but silent on how they will be attained. This
was done in order to allow adaptation to a variety of situations, recognizing (i) the advantages of a
succinct and readable policy document, (ii) the need to allow maximum flexibility for future implementors
who will be working under unpredictable conditions. National and expatriate experts played a major
role, as did frank and open discussions between government, the funding agencies and teacher unions
over a sustained period. Although at times quite argumentative, these discussions played a constructive
role.
Implementation was characterized by (i) a large degree of participation within MoE that was
organized around several working groups, (ii) structured donor coordination under the auspices of MoE,
(iii) stability of the MoE team of higher-level staff implicated in the policy formulation phase, and (iv)
strong and highly effective leadership from the Minister who remained in office for about seven years
(until 1996) that covered the formulation of the policy statement and its implementation. Staff stability
has contributed to the professionalization of MoE teams and, therefore, the quality of implementation.
Actual results went beyond the targets set in the policy document.
The major messages from this case study are the importance of: (i) strong, collegial and continuous
leadership; (ii) a policy document that allows for flexibility and is not overly detailed; (iii) the continuity
and stability of a team that is involved in both the policy formulation and implementation phases; and
(iv) ministerial leadership in the process of donor coordination. All of these factors contributed to the
successful implementation of Guinea’s educational adjustment program.

MAURITIUS
The Master Plan (MP) was elaborated 7-8 years after the minister had (upon taking office in
1983) decided not to apply agreed adjustment measures to the education sector. Mauritius is a very small
country, a democracy, and at the time of the MP, its economy was strong and growing. Furthermore, the
Ministry of Education was characterized by a high degree of stability (the same minister was in office
from 1983 to 1995) under strong leadership.
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The need for the MP came from a diagnosis of the education system’s shortcomings, perhaps
foremost of which was that the economic and social changes of the 1980s were not accompanied by
corresponding changes in the education system. In the late 1980s, the future of the Mauritian economy
was seen to depend on skill-intensive activities and a well-educated labor force. Also, the Jomtien
Declaration on Education for All, plus a meeting of funding agencies on human resource development,
provided impetus for developing the MP. Although work on the Plan was initiated locally, international
funding agencies played an important role. Most notably, they provided technical expertise and perspectives
that were lacking in-country. In some areas, national counterparts were not available, so some of this
expertise was not sustained locally.
Consultation was extensive during the preparatory phases of the MP and the continual search for
consensus (a basic cultural value in Mauritius) often took precedence over pedagogic and social
considerations. This is related to the fact that the Plan took more than twice as much time to prepare as
was originally assumed. A coordinator was appointed in order to orchestrate both the consultative and
technical aspects of MP preparation. Although advisor to the minister since 1983 and well integrated
into the ministry, the coordinator was not from within the MoE career stream. He was an economist who,
previously, had worked in the Ministry of Finance.
This case study also demonstrates the beneficial effects of donor coordination in a context where
the country takes charge. In this case, a detailed Master Plan was the necessary condition for “taking
charge”, as it became an unavoidable reference point for all concerned. Strong ministerial leadership and
a consensus were major aspects of this process.

MOZAMBIQUE
This case is different than the others in that it traces the post-independence history of education
policies to the present time when all agree that new beginnings are needed. In sharp contrast with the
other countries discussed here, post-independence Mozambique opted for an education system that was
not based on that of its former colonial master. However, it is presently agreed that that system is not
adequate for current needs. The time is ripe, therefore, for formulation of a new education policy.
Several factors play important roles in the policy making process. For one, the poor state of
Mozambique’s infrastructure (roads and telecommunications) inhibits effective consultations. Another
factor is the predominant role of donors in the financing of the State. The agenda for sector studies
appears to be largely set by the funding agencies. However, Government is beginning to provide more
input into this process and, recently, has taken the lead in donor coordination.

UGANDA
When the new regime took power in 1986 after a long guerrilla war the country was in a state of
economic collapse, political turmoil and social decline. As a result, a new philosophy of fundamental
change through participatory democracy, liberalization, modernization, unity and accelerated development
was introduced. However, policies of self-reliance gave way to externally financed adjustment programs
in 1988. In the education sector there was a long tradition—dating back to 1928—of review commissions
at regular ten-year intervals. The process of policy formation went through two phases: an Education
Policy Review Commission (1987-89) and a White Paper (WP) Committee which undertook the work of
policy formation in 1989.
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A prominent aspect of the Ugandan case is the search for ever-increasing legitimacy for education
policies through deeper consultation and participation which are important values of Government’s
ideology. The work of both the Commission and the WP Committee was characterized by public
consultations. The former held public meetings and solicited a total of 496 memoranda and resource
papers and was, by far, the widest consultation on education ever in Uganda. However, the consultations
concentrated on urban elites and key community stakeholders were not consulted. Because of this, the
Commission was seen by many as being part of the old system. Although its report made important
recommendations for change, in many cases teachers, lower officials and others who participated in the
process did so under the culture of fear of the dominant bureaucrats, politicians and the economic elite.
The WP process aimed at correcting this situation. Under strong and active ministerial leadership with
the active support of the President himself, a bottom-up, consensus building process was undertaken,
along with analysis of the Commission’s report and public responses to it.
Funding agencies had their own agendas which did not fit well with the slower WP process of
policy formation. This was facilitated by the absence of a government master plan. It was in this context
that funding agencies produced studies and projects outside of the WP framework. This was somewhat
justified by the inertia of government bureaucrats and the weaknesses of government’s internal operations.

LESSONS FROM THE CASE STUDIES: ANALYSIS AND EXPERIENCE15
Drawing from the case studies, as well as from participant contributions at the Tours Biennial
Meeting, this section concentrates on the major lessons that emerge and that may have broad applicability.
Each sub-heading is in the form of a question, immediately followed by the major points that emerge
from the subsequent paragraphs.

The context: what conditions trigger an education policy review?
➤ Crisis and/or change motivated by political and economic factors often precipitate
policy reviews.
➤ Education reforms can reinforce the legitimacy of new governments.
➤ The political and institutional contexts are crucial factors.
For many countries the first key issue is simple: “When should a national process of education
policy review be initiated and how does one get started?” The first step in the process involves assessing
the context. The case studies point to the fact that national reviews of education are often triggered by
some combination of crisis and/or change motivated by political and economic factors:
•

after a new, often revolutionary and/or newly democratic, government has come to power—as in
Benin, Mali and Uganda;

•

at the end of a period of conflict or war—as in Mozambique and Uganda;

•

when public dissatisfaction with the condition of education reaches a level where it can no
longer be ignored—as in Benin, Ghana and Guinea;

•

when macroeconomic adjustment, often linked with reliance on external development financing,
obliges government to reorient its financing and budgetary strategies and practices—as in Benin,
Mauritius, Ghana and Guinea.
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Other factors can also motivate the decision for a policy review. In Mauritius, the decision was
motivated by the growing awareness that the current educational system was not able to produce the
kinds of graduates needed by the crucial export economy of the island. In rare cases, like Botswana, the
policy process has been institutionalized in a manner which promotes systematic consultation on policy
issues at all levels of society.
Governments have different motivations for undertaking a national review of education policy.
For many governments, education is a critical institution for socialization into values and beliefs. Also,
successful delivery of educational services is central to a regime’s legitimacy and, therefore its capacity
for effective governance. If, for example, access is limited, dropout rates high and educational quality
poor, people will be dissatisfied with the government. New governments need to establish credibility that
they can function effectively—and education provides one of the most visible ways of demonstrating
their competence.
These days, there is the tendency to summarize the political context by the level of democratization.
Although somewhat reductionist, this can be a useful approach, especially since the making and
implementation of education policy does involve a broad spectrum of the population. With the exception
of Mauritius—whose entire post-colonial history is characterized by fully democratic government—all
the countries studied here have undergone varying degrees of transition towards more democratic and
open forms of government and political expression, as well as economic liberalism. In this respect, it is
noteworthy that the Benin and Ghana case studies find that educational activism (a broad-based forum in
Benin shortly after the advent of the democratic regime; a wide-ranging reform in Ghana, shortly after
abandoning self-reliance for IMF-led adjustment) served the Governments’ legitimation needs. Actually,
this is an old story in the annals of educational reform.16 Actual reform in Benin since its forum has been
relatively minor, whereas the structure of Ghana’s education system has been largely overhauled. As for
results in terms of learning, however, the jury is still out on the Ghanian case.
The context in terms of predispositions to open to public dialogue on education varies. Some of
the variables which may indicate receptivity to dialogue in a country would include:
•

the degree of decentralization of decision-making and control over resources;

•

the extent to which political leaders are accountable; the existence of accountability mechanisms,
elections or other checks such as a parliamentary question process;

•

the existence of a free press and non-government radio in the country;

•

the ideology of the ruling party—is it explicit about encouraging participation ingovernance?

•

the presence of a country-wide participatory structure—is it within a political party or across
parties?

•

a history of public dialogue about the education policy process—are there accepted procedures
which are familiar because of their past use?

•

government receptivity to input from civil society, and openness of public officials to other
perspectives; and

•

the existence of capable non-governmental agencies with a history of undertaking policy analysis
and publicizing their findings.

Whatever the current degree of receptivity to dialogue, the policy making process will have to take place
within that context. However, strong leadership in education can result in innovations which have no
historical precedents in that context. Several of the Francophone cases describe fairly radical changes as
the result of new governments.
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An excellent example of the education policy challenge facing a new government was presented
at the Tours Conference by Professor Bengu, the Minister of Education of South Africa. He stressed two
major political imperatives for the process of policy making in education: the need (i) to ensure consensus
around national education policy, and (ii) to locate the resulting policies within the framework set out by
the interim constitution. The central position of the education struggle in the years before the end of
apartheid led to a need for demonstrable signs of progress in education soon after the new government
took power. For them, timing and opportunity were two vital factors in initiating policy development,
particularly as they faced the challenge of balancing tensions between preservation of minority privileges
and transformation of the system to meet the needs of the majority.
Countries in severe economic difficulty will likely be under strong pressure from the funding
agencies to undertake structural reforms, including a rationalization and strengthening of basic social
services like education. As the case studies make clear, funding agencies have often played a significant
role in initiating or supporting policy formulation. Funding agencies have supported data collection for
policy analysis, helped organize meetings where policy alternatives are discussed, and provided both
local and international technical assistance for various steps in the policy cycle. Not infrequently funding
agencies have made the existence of a coherent policy framework a pre-condition for further investment
in the education sector, thereby exerting pressure on governments to undertake a full review of education
policy.
A counter-example of this is Mauritius, which was in the middle of its adjustment phase, with
requirements for reduced spending in education, when the then newly appointed Minister of Education
disassociated his ministry from the adjustment measures. His reasons were as political as they were
educational. Subsequent events suggest that his refusal to apply adjustment measures to the education
system harmed neither the education system nor the macroeconomic climate. To the contrary, it could be
argued that by maintaining the reliability of the education system and its capacity to deliver uninterrupted
services to the population—instead of focusing on the elimination of inefficiencies with potentially
disruptive consequences—the Mauritian policy contributed to the enabling environment that preceded
that country’s strong economicgrowth.17
Discussions on several panels at Tours stressed the “normality” of unstable conditions in Africa.
Many presenters felt that policy making nearly always took place in a context of uncertainty, tension, and
sometimes overt conflict. Minister Chombo of Zimbabwe felt that there seemed to be one crisis after
another: “There has never been a stable situation when we could sit down, assess how well we were
doing and reflect on how we should plan for the future. We also didn’t have sufficient resources to be
doing planning, implementation, and evaluation at the same time.” Minister Nhavoto of Mozambique
reminded listeners that his country had been in a state of guerilla war for almost thirty years with a
resulting 93% illiteracy rate, and very few primary secondary schools able to function. Planning under
these circumstances requires national mobilization to rebuild educational systems and begin the process
of restoring the human infrastructure for development.
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What structures or methods can be used for policy review?
➤

Expert and representative teams are often formed to establish a diagnosis and guide
the process.

➤

Social, political and historical contexts are determinant: in general, commissions or
national conferences are central.

When conditions are favorable for initiating a national review of education policy, what procedures
have been used by African countries? The case studies show two clear patterns which, not surprisingly,
grow out of the colonial heritage of the countries. In all cases, work has been initiated by teams composed
of MoE staff and external (expatriate and/or national) experts. These teams are charged with establishing
a diagnosis of the prevailing situation (including benchmarks) of carrying out a process of policy review
and formulation. The process involves, in varying proportions: identifying issues in the education sector,
assessing a variety of suggested solutions, and producing a coherent set of policy recommendations
which, after review by the government, can become the basis of reform and development for the nation’s
educational system. The characteristics of the process are very much conditioned by the national context
and the historical precedents for policy making.
In the Anglophone cases—Botswana, Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda, and Mauritius as well—the
process is quite explicit and is based on an historical pattern which goes back well before independence.
Periodically, government appoints a National Education Policy Review Commission which is a temporary,
independent group charged by government with the task of looking at education, soliciting inputs from a
range of people interested in the sector, and formulating a coherent set of policy recommendations. The
Commission is typically chaired by a distinguished national educator and includes representatives of all
the major stakeholders ineducation in the country. Many commissions have working groups for specific
sub-sectors like primary education or teacher training, each of which draws professionals from the
appropriate ministries and from society. The final commission report is presented to government and
often made available to the general public as well. Government then responds with a White Paper indicating
which recommendations it is accepting in part or in whole. The process is well understood in these
countries and it is regarded as a legitimate method—inherited from Britain—for the government and
civil society to work together in drafting education policy.
Not surprisingly, given the differences in colonial heritage, the Francophone cases—Benin,
Guinea, Mali, Senegal—reflect a rather different approach to policy formulation. In these countries, the
emphasis is on consulting national and international experts. The consultation of civil society takes place
through a formally convened national debate on education policy matters. The cases reflect a varied
pattern of irregularly convened Etats Généraux, or National Seminars on Education, often preceded by
preparatory activities. These are large national meetings, often comprised of several hundred people who
get together for two or three days or more (ten days in Benin) to debate issues in education. There may or
may not be any formal document or pronouncement resulting from such gatherings. The outcomes are
viewed by government as advisory and there is usually no formal response on the part of the government.
The Ministry of Education chooses what to do with the information and advice it has received during the
meetings. Occasionally, the gathering is a way to inform participants and to mobilize support for a policy
which the government is on the point of implementing. Teachers and their unions tend to be overrepresented in comparison to parents and employers. The process tends to become more politicized than
in the Anglophone countries.
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Both of these patterns offer models which, with suitable adaptation to local circumstances, may
be helpful to other countries with similar historical contexts. Different approaches are found in Mauritius
and Mozambique which reflect their own cultural, political and historical contexts. Mauritius exemplifies
a country with a diverse cultural composition which has evolved a politics of consensus in the context of
relatively high economic development. Mozambique reflects a country emerging from decades of civil
war that is resource poor and lacks a tradition of participation by civil society in education policy formation.
In all cases, the importance of the historically generated patterns of consultation and expectations of the
role of government cannot be over-emphasized; they set the context within which any policy process
must operate.

What knowledge base is needed?
➤ Baseline, monitoring and evaluation information are essential.
➤ In general, production of information is a good investment; its utility goes far beyond
the context of immediate problem-solving.
➤ The usefulness of the information is closely linked to how well it is known and
understood by all concerned.

By and large, the knowledge base can take two different forms:
(a)

Baseline information (data) that is a starting point for the work of policy makers. Collection of
this information is often called policy or sector analysis. Collection of such information can
involve the Ministry of Finance and can, if needed, be conducted outside of the Ministry of
Education.

(b)

Continually collected information designed to assess the progress of policy implementation. This
is generally known as monitoring and evaluation and is useful in order to ensure that organizations
such as Ministries of Education behave as “learning institutions”, in a position to learn from ongoing and recent experience.

All of the case studies refer to a knowledge base of the first type, where the information was produced for
the specific purposes of the policy formation process.
Four case studies illustrate different approaches to the relationships between policy formation
and the knowledge base:
(a)

In Benin, a thorough sector analysis was carried out under the direction of working committees
with external support from UNDP and UNESCO. Large amounts of information and analytical
knowledge were produced, some of which had little immediate impact on policy in a context of
weak leadership from the minister and uneven funding agency implication.

(b)

In Ghana funding agencies were heavily implicated in support of a reform that was authoritarianly
decreed with little analytical support. Information concerning very poor learning results became
available well into implementation that caused a reassessment of the approaches taken.

(c)

In Mauritius there was a combination of locally produced policy analysis on pedagogical issues
that was useful and work produced by foreign experts that was not fully integrated into the
policy formation processes for lack of national capacities of appropriation (lack of counterparts).
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(d)

In Uganda a series of 16 pre-investment studies, mostly carried out by two-person teams of a
national specialist and an international consultant, were commissioned on topics suchas: teacher
supply and demand, science and technical education, textbooks and instructional materials, the
financing of primary education, and an enrollment projection model. During the same period the
planning unit undertook a national school census using a revised and expanded instrument.

In Benin, the knowledge base was constituted before government and funding agencies had
specified their needs. The pertinence of the information became clear only when the government entered
into the initial phases of the policy formation process with the Etats Généraux. This is consistent with
the point of view that policy makers are often unable to predict future information needs.18 Indeed, this
view of the usefulness of policy analysis to policy formation suggests that the library (where information
is stocked and used on demand, at the appropriate times) is the appropriate analogy, rather than the
problem solving metaphor which is more commonly employed. The problem solving perspective imposes
a narrow definition for the utility of information to policy analysis. At issue, rather, is informed
interpretation, grounded in a mass of readily available information (such as could be found in a library).
If papers were written only when it was clear that they would be used for problem solving, then
the information would not be available for use by the time the policy makers wanted it.... The uncertainty
and unpredictability of the context make it nearly impossible for the production of information to conform
to the expectations promoted by the problem solving perspective.19
None of the cases presents a model for the development of a knowledge base designed to serve
policy formation, assuming such a model exists, and no consistent pattern can be found in the studies.
Two very different cases are, nonetheless, illustrative:
(a)

In Benin, the studies and information collection were designed and undertaken before any need
for them became apparent and before educational reform became part of the national agenda.
Although perhaps not used to the fullest of their potential, the studies proved useful for a
subsequent consultative forum and policy statement, as well as for attracting a major funding
agency to the education sector. Furthermore, in an absence of organized coordination between
funding agencies, these studies had a “coordinating effect” in that they became an unavoidable
point of reference for all—national and foreign—working in the education sector.

(b)

In Ghana, extensive reform was undertaken in the absence of policy analysis and related studies.
About 7-8 years later their need became painfully evident. It is impossible to estimate the “cost”
of having proceeded with the reform in the absence of a detailed knowledge base. However, the
need for clear baseline data, monitoring information, as well as more analytical studies became
clear in 1991-93 when student testing showed that little-to-no learning was taking place in the
schools despite massive investments.

In the countries studied, the knowledge base constituted a combination of statistics and some
studies, generally including one on the costs and financing of education. In none of these cases, however,
did the knowledge base appear to be a determining factor. At best, it appears to have been a necessary,
but not sufficient, input into the policy making process. One is tempted to conclude, therefore, that: (i)
the costs of a lack of information can be high; (ii) the costs of producing, even over-producing, information
may turn out to be an excellent investment; and (iii) production of information is a necessary, but far
from sufficient, input into the policy formation processes.
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The usefulness of the knowledge base is also related to its assimilation, appropriation and
dissemination. In this respect, it has a capacity building function. Benin and Mauritius are illustrative. In
Benin, the policy analysis studies were conducted by expatriate experts working closely with nationals.
Their participation in the studies had a learning-by-doing effect which was subsequently recognized in
the form of promotions to key technical positions within MoE and other ministries (Finance and Planning).
In Mauritius, on the other hand, national counterparts were not in a position to assimilate the technical
work of foreign experts which, therefore, never became appropriated and part and parcel of a continuous
process of policy formation.

How is a coherent and sustainable policy framework assembled?
➤ Priorities need to be established and choices made between policy options.
➤ One should distinguish between treating the symptoms and tackling the root causes
of persistent issues.

Once issues have been identified, the analysis shifts to understanding the causes and looking for
ways to address the issues. Many problems in education are symptoms produced by complex combinations
of factors, and cannot be fixed with simple, single-factor solutions. For instance, the all too common
problems of dropouts and repeaters are often cited as policy targets, with little thought about how to
change classroom activities and the behavior of the pupils. Extensive research in many settings has
demonstrated that dropouts, particularly of girls, are caused by multiple non-school factors—family
economics, perceptions of the utility of schooling, cultural gender norms—most of which are not readily
influenced by government policy or action. The problem of repeaters is often addressed by administrative
fiat—rules prohibiting repetition or limiting the number of times a pupil can repeat. This approach
ignores the real causes of the problem, which may be poor teaching, low nutrition, lack of textbooks, or
even the inadequacy of the teachers’ assessment skills. So, the task of seeking possible solutions to
problems requires access to existing research on a regional and international level, as well as research
and knowledge rooted in local cultural and historical conditions.
Another example is would be the reality test of financial feasibility and sustainability. Although
securing adequate resources for the education sector was an issue in all the cases studied, the nature of
the problem could vary radically. In Benin, on the one hand, the educationsector historically garnered
over 30% of the government budget with decreasingly satisfactory results. Here the policy options focused
on improving the efficient use of available resources. In Guinea, on the other hand, the education sector
was clearly underfinanced and policy aimed at increasing resources. In both cases, however, analytical
tools (financial simulation models) were used to develop policy options and assess the long-term financial
impact of proposed educational measures such as teacher recruitment and other personnel policies and
qualitative inputs designed to reduce repetition and drop-out rates.
Policy formation ultimately requires making choices between policy options. Selecting an option
for a specific problem relies on the evaluation of the pros and cons of the options. Two sets of criteria
come into play: (i) technical judgements based on available information, research knowledge, educational
practice, and an assessment of financial capability; and (ii) judgements based on an understanding of the
local context—political, economic, cultural and social. Once a series of choices has been made, there
still remains the difficult task of assembling the choices into a coherent and feasible overall framework
of policies.
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In those settings where an education commission is appointed, the commission produces a detailed
report summarizing its overall policy structure. However, most commission reports have serious
shortcomings when viewed as coherent policy statements. Because the process is widely consultative
and the combined membership of the commission and its working groups can be quite large, the report
usually reflects a series of compromises when choices have to be made. The result is commonly a long
list of policy objectives—often more than 200, sometimes referred to as a “wish list.” The document
accurately reflects the desired goals a nation has for its educational system and is valuable for that
reason. Therefore, a subsequent process is needed to make hard choices to set priorities for implementation
in the light of resource constraints. A first step in that direction comes in the form of a White Paper which
sets forth the government’s position on the recommendations of the commission. Even the White Paper
usually deals primarily with the general acceptability of the policies, not specifically with their economic
or administrative feasibility.
In settings where national seminars are used for policy discussion, a different means is used to
produce an overall policy framework for the country. National meetings and preparatory committees
produce the components for an overall policy, but the task remains with the government to produce a
written statement. In some cases there may be no complete statement, but rather a series of decrees and
actions implementing parts of the recommended policies. In the case of Senegal, after the Etats Généraux
of 1981 a National Commission was appointed to translate the resolutions produced into implementable
educational policies and practices. Yet, their final report was submitted to the president of Republic three
years later. Guinea provides an interesting example which illustrates the linkage between the amount of
support which generated for policies and the level of specificity which is appropriate. This is described
in Box 3.
Box 3: Building Support for Policies
The example of Guinea’s Programme d’ajustement de secteur de l’éducation (PASE) is especially interesting as it
followed neither Commission/White Paper approach nor that of Etats Généraux. Instead, through a series of internal
workshops, the education ministry—working with other key ministers—undertook a problem identification and diagnostic exercise. External funding agencies assisted the diagnostic and analytic work by staffing and participating
in the on-the-job training of sector staff through these workshops, which led to a shared consensus on the main
problems and their respective priorities.
The Ministry of Education then formed a small internal commission to prepare a sector policy declaration that laid
out in clear terms the government’s goals and priorities. It was deliberately kept short and focussed and did not spell
out in detail all the specific operational objectives or strategies (in contrast with Mauritius, where wide consultation
in the design phase led to very detailed “Master Plan”). The sector declaration was submitted to the Council of
Ministers for official government approval, which was both rapid and unanimous. Thus, the Ministry of Education
had—with its own staff—prepared a broad, but short, policy declaration which was endorsed by government, and
supported by its own staff and that of the central ministries.
At this point, the real work in building support for the policies of the PASE began. Implementation of the policy
statement required a further stage in which broad goals were translated into a series of specific action plans and
prepared by the regional and national authorities responsible for their implementation. At this stage, the question
was no longer “what should be done?” but rather “how should ‘x’ be done?”. The whole sectoral ministry was
mobilized and consultations inside the sector and throughout the country were widespread. Each year for the period
1990-1994, action plans were prepared by the education managers throughout the country. To ensure wide support
and understanding of the PASE, the national workshops that prepared each annual action plan took place in a different location of the country. The minister and senior ministry staff undertook regular visits to the regions and wide use
was made of the media (press and radio). A special newsletter on the PASE and its progress was produced and
widely circulated. The annual participative planning exercise laid out clear operational goals for each region, it
identified bottlenecks and delays, and contributed to a real sense of purpose and national ownership in the program.
The results of the PASE over the last five years speak for themselves, as the gross enrollment ratio rose from 28% in
the late 1980s to 40% in 1993.

1 7

FORMULATING EDUCATION POLICY: LESSONS AND EXPERIENCE FROM SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

How much consultation and participation are necessary?
➤ Ownership or appropriation through consultation and participation are necessary
conditions for successful policy implementation. How much, can only be decided
locally.
➤ A wide spectrum of stakeholders should be part of the process.
To be effective, education policy formation must be seen as a social and political process as
much as it is a task of technical analysis. Both are necessary, but the latter has tended to take priority,
particularly with the funding agencies. After decades of reasoning that the “best”policies were those that
made the most sense technically, the development community has come to realize the overarching
importance of national/local appropriation for effective policy implementation.20 Without data and technical
analysis, policy will remain vague and will reflect the entrenched interests of the status quo. Without
active social and political participation in the policy formation processes, the outcomes can be policies
which are not implemented and, even, generate active public opposition.
The goal of the policy formation process is not simply the production of a policy document. The
most important goal is to create a social learning process so that key participants in education, including
parents and students, come to understand the nature of the problems faced, the resource constraints
which exist, and the kinds of tradeoffs which will be needed to achieve the desired educational outcomes.
This idea was reinforced at the conference by Mr. Ash Hartwell, USAID policy analyst, who suggested:
“We are not building a road, we are raising a family, and that means that you had best consult everybody
in the family, including the relatives. Policy isn’t a solution to a problem but a continuous process of
growth and nurturance.” When carried out effectively such a process can produce general awareness of
the problems, neutralize potential opposition, and mobilize support for the difficult policy choices which
are inevitable in developing contexts. The importance of participation was also stressed by the keynote
speaker at Tours, Mr. Timothy Thahane, former World Bank Secretary and Vice President and presently
Deputy Governor of the South Africa Reserve Bank, who concluded his speech by noting that the processes
of economic and political liberalization “...require broad-based participation and their sustainability
depends on the internalization and institutionalization of that participation.”
The six case studies all demonstrate—but in different fashions—the importance of strategies for
appropriation through participation and consultation. The case studies show that participation and
consultation are not the same. Consultation can often take the form of a campaign to explain policies
made in an authoritarian manner. Participation, on the other hand, mobilizes those most directly concerned
with the policies (teachers, educational administrators and parents).
What parts of government and society need to participate in the policy process? There are many
stakeholders who are critical to successful education policy making (which includes implementation):
officials in the education bureaucracy, both central and local; officials in other ministries, particularly
finance and planning, civil service and often local government; legislators and representatives of groups
from civil society such as religious bodies for schools, relevant unions and political organizations; and
parents, employers and chambers of commerce. Which stakeholders are particularly important depends
on the local context. Not all groups have to participate equally at all stages of the policy process. Some
will be more important when identification of issues is being considered, others will be essential as
technical solutions are discussed, and still others have the power to block implementation strategies
unless they are consulted at that stage. The answer to the question of “who should participate?” depends
on thestage of the policy process, the nature of the specific policy being considered, and the local context.
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The local context also influences the amount and kind of consultation that is appropriate. It can
be useful to ask two key questions:
•

What groups benefit from the current distribution of educational services in society? and,

•

Who would lose and who would gain if specific policy changes were made?

Reflecting on these groups and their power to either support or hinder proposed changes will provide a
good beginning in thinking about who should participate in the process of diagnosis, analysis, and
formulation of policies for education. What organizations, religious groups, ethnic associations, or regional
groups exist which have a strong interest in education? How are teachers organized? What means do
parents and students have of expressing their concerns about education as it is now, or changes which are
being proposed? What do employers want from the education system? Finally, it is always essential to
ask what groups have the power to block implementation of particular policies, and how such groups can
be transformed into supporters of new policies.
One short-term “cost” of high levels of participation is the time it takes to complete the process.
This is demonstrated in Uganda and Mauritius where extensive participation delayed the formulation of
sector policies well beyond initial estimates. In Uganda and Mozambique this resulted in impatience by
the external financing agencies whose timing was not compatible with that of those Governments. In
Uganda, the agencies implemented their projects before the policy formulation process was officially
completed. Ghana used an explanatory campaign to market policies that were formulated and initially
implemented in a rather authoritarian manner. This was deemed necessary in order to take advantage of
a “window of opportunity” that policy makers sensed would not last. However, improved learning results
were not forthcoming—even five years after initial implementation—and a second policy phase took a
more participatory tack. In Guinea, staff from the education ministry and other ministries participated
along with union representatives. Parents, however, were largely absent from this process. The success
of the Guinean reforms are partly a result of the nature of the consultations and the leadership qualities of
the minister.21

How important are leadership, institutional stability and coordination?
➤ Strong and stable leadership along with institutional stability are crucial for successful
and sustained policy formation and implementation.
➤ Effective donor coordination requires the active leadership of national authorities;
funding agencies, themselves, are learning that this is necessary for the success of
their programs and investments.

Strong leadership, institutional stability, and ministerial staff continuity are essential for initiating
and sustaining a participatory process, as well as for enabling and empowering ministries to take the
active and lead role in the coordination of funding agencies. Ministerial (i.e., political) stability and staff
continuity in Guinea, Mauritius and Uganda were closely associated with those countries’ ability to
formulate their respective policy documents and develop their institutional capacities for implementation.
Although very different in terms of their respective economic contexts, ministerial and staff stability
were crucial factors in enabling Guinea and Mauritius to bring their policies to fruition and implementation.
The policies undertaken by these two countries were, in many respects, the most ambitious and complex
of the six case studies—ambitious in terms of the nature of the policies tackled as well as their abilities
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Box 4: Using Forceful Leadership for Educational Innovation
In 1986 Ghana’s military regime decided to undertake a significant reform of the educational system, which had
deteriorated so badly that some educators had pronounced it “clinically dead.” The government, in keeping with its
military, revolutionary style, chose to implement the reform by directive, announcing both the content and timing
of the reforms with little prior consultation. The leadership believed that achieving significant reform of education
was essential to the social transformation of society and that the regime’s political legitimacy depended on succeeding
where preceding governments had failed. The content of the reforms were rooted in recommendations of a Commission report presented 13 years earlier.
A small cadre of professional educators who were firmly committed to the reforms was assembled in the Ministry
of Education to carry out the implementation. The agency that had dealt with all personnel and professional
matters in education in Ghana was abolished, thus removing the protective cover of education officials. Officials
at all levels were expected to act as military officers, carrying out orders without discussion. Those who objected
or raised concerns were disciplined—sometimes by dismissal, creating an atmosphere of resentment and fear in
which problems were likely to go unreported. The government organized a national forum, convened a seminar
with district representatives, and used the media for an information campaign about the rationale and structure of
the reforms. There was little tolerance for dissenting views; the goal was rapid and effective implementation of the
reform as announced.
This approach produced a fairly radical structural reform in a short time period, reducing the number of years in
school and implementing a new curriculum. The first cohort from the new system graduated from secondary school
at the end of 1993, but did very poorly on the examination. Reforms at the tertiary level were also implemented,
some of which were very unpopular with the elites who benefitted from the existing system. On the positive side,
the use of strong, centralized leadership pushed through a needed set of reforms despite the inevitable opposition of
those who lost privileges. On the negative side, the reforms produced very low quality results in the first groups
and created an atmosphere of tension and disillusionment among many of the educators who were needed to run the
system.
In a currently more open political environment, Ghana is now re-examining the reforms, holding extensive consultations with a variety of stakeholders, and is embarking on a new cycle of policy formation in education.

to attract external financing. The nature of the leadership exercised by the ministers, combined with their
relative stability and staff continuity played a significant role in the outcomes of those countries’ policy
efforts.
Implementation of policies requires strong leadership to provide an unwavering vision of the
goal and reliable support as administrative units confront unanticipated problems and resistance from
those who oppose aspects of the plan. Implementation of any significant reform in education, as reflected
in a set of new policies, requires not just a single leader, but a group of leaders, preferably organized into
some sort of management council or committee. Both Guinea and Ghana have instituted oversight
committees to monitor progress in the reform. Institutionalizing such a committee, at least for the period
of the reform process, helps to insulate the reform from changes in personnel or over-dependence on the
personality and power of any single individual leader. Implementation may also mean reconciling
unrealistic “political promises”made by political leaders with technical and resource constraints.
Continuity in leadership is one point often overlooked by African countries and funding agencies
alike. One of the major constraints to effective management of education in sub-Saharan Africa is rapid
rotation of the political leadership of the Ministry of Education. Indeed, one minister remarked that the
post of education ministers has a lot in common with an electrical fuse: when the system gets too hot, the
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fuse is replaced! The case for strong and stable leadership of a sector is clear. Education is a system that
takes anywhere between six and sixteen years to produce its graduates; rapid change of the sector leadership
can only handicap education development. This feeling was echoed by the comments of Christopher
Shaw of DAE, who stressed that “Policy formulation requires strong leadership and continuity.... it is the
one industry where we keep changing the managing director every one or two years. It’s not surprising
that the industry is not terribly efficient.” Two of the case studies demonstrate that continuity through
strong and stable leadership is an essential component for implementing the full set of education reforms
throughout the system. It is no surprise that many of those countries that have successfully implemented
far reaching reforms of their education systems (Mauritius and Guinea, to name but two) have benefitted
from stable and strong sector leadership.
Related to the issue of leadership, is a ministry’s ability and willingness to take the lead in the
area of “donor” coordination. The question of “donor” coordination has been often raised but barely
treated in a systematic manner.22 One major conclusion can be drawn from the case studies: the only
effective and sustainable approach to donor coordination is when it is done under the active stewardship
of national authorities such as the minister of education. This was the case in Guinea and Mauritius,
although in Guinea coordination became more difficult as the process went from policy formulation to
implementation. In Benin, where funding agencies expressed real willingness to support that country’s
newly democratic political structures, there was little coordination for want of a strong and clear ministerial
position on the matter.

What is the relationship between policy formation and capacity building?
➤ Effective appropriation or ownership can occur only if capacity building is an integral
part of the policy formation processes.
➤ Partnerships can effectively promote capacity building.

“Capacity building” has become one of the major themes of the day, and for good reason. It has
even become the rage in private industry where it is now recognized that the best firms—the most
productive—are “learning organizations” in a mode of continual learning.23 Clearly, this should also be
the case for education ministries which have huge managerial and financial responsibilities that engage
the future of a country and all its people. Severalapproaches to capacity building are illustrated in the
case studies, including decentralization and the involvement of national experts in a host of policy analysis
studies on a learning-by-doing basis. In Mauritius, where technical assistance was needed for work
required for the Master Plan, there was little longer-term capacity building for lack of a clear strategy of
implicating qualified nationals in the work of the expatriate experts. In this case, the ministry did not
have the requisite technicians who could appropriate the work of the experts. Although the technical
work (forecast modeling) was useful for the Master Plan, it was not internalized by the Mauritian ministry,
for lack of experienced staff.
Benin is a special case here in that it was the site of a large, internationally financed policy
analysis project that intensively involved numerous ministerial staff (including staff from planning and
finance ministries) in diagnostic sector studies that gave way to investment-oriented action plans. Although
the policy options proposed by the studies were only moderately followed by the ministry, which was
characterized by rather ambiguous leadership, the results of the studies, as well as the know-how required
to carry them out, became very much integrated into the culture of the education ministry. A
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disproportionate number of the ministry staff who worked on those studies have been subsequently
promoted to positions of responsibility—a fact that augers well for the longer-range capacity building
effects of that experience.
Mr. Ingemar Gustafsson, Deputy Director at Swedish Sida and DAE Chairperson, addressed the
question of the growing importance of partnerships for capacity building. This is exemplified by the
dialogue between funding agencies and African governments that is facilitated by the DAE. Furthermore,
the meaning of partnership has evolved with the recognition that donor coordination can only be effectively
done by the country. Funding agencies now better understand that they must play a supporting role which
assists African governments by promoting capacity building, which he sees as basically a “learning
process and the use of knowledge.” With this kind of partnership, the activities of the funding agencies
should promote the national integrity of the policy formation process. Where necessary, they should
adapt agency priorities and procedures to facilitate that process.

How does analysis pave the way for policy choices?
➤ Technically sound policy proposals need to be prioritized and confront the opinion
of the relevant constituencies.
➤ Assessment of the financial feasibility of recommended policies is a must.

Even after a relatively coherent statement of policies has been produced in the form of a
commission report or statements from a national seminar, most countries are a long way from a clear set
of policy decisions which can be used by governments and funding agencies as a basis for making
budgetary and investment decisions. Such reports reflect some winnowing of policy options, but they are
valuable primarily because their recommendations are statements of collectively shared values and goals,
such as: universal primary education by the year 2000, vocationalization of the curriculum, or substantially
increased access to secondary education. Sometimes issues are deliberately left unclear, indicating that
the process was unable to reconcile conflicts over key issues. A good example of the latter is often found
in language policy, where recommendations are frequently vague or contain a variety of options left to
political leaders to deal with.
In Anglophone countries, the next step is often a government White Paper, usually produced by
a small committee of educational professionals from the Ministry of Education, in consultation, perhaps,
with a few key stakeholders. Historically, most White Papers are short comments on the major
recommendations of the commission, approving or rejecting some recommendations and amending others.
The result is a somewhat refined list of goals, usually without a time line or any detailed attempt to test
the economic feasibility of those recommendations that have been accepted. The White Paper is still
essentially a political document, indicating the government’s position on the issues. In countries which
use other mechanisms, there may or may not be a public document stating the government’s position
other than what was produced by a national meeting (see Box 5).
Policy formation also requires assessment of the financial feasibility of recommended policies.
Nearly all African countries face severe resource constraints which make many policy targets unreachable
in the medium term—particularly goals like universal primary education or substantial increases in the
salaries of teachers. Determining just how fast a policy goal can bereached is a challenging task, requiring
fairly sophisticated data and modeling capacity to estimate the financial implications of various options.
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Box 5: An Innovative White Paper Process
Uganda’s most recent Education Commission engaged in extensive consultation during the process of reviewing
national education policy. They held hearings in different parts of the country, received hundreds of written submissions on different policy issues, and traveled to neighboring countries to learn from their experience. Yet, some
of the leaders of the national political party felt that the process had been limited to the same elite group which had
been in control of the country since independence. They felt that a broader range of participation was essential to
build a new Uganda.
They chose to use the White Paper process, normally a quick technical review, to reopen and widen the debate on
education policy issues. In the end the process lasted almost three years as the White Paper went through three
drafts before being debated in parliament. Several innovations were used. First, the White Paper was a complete
re-write of the Commission’s Report which meant that it was long, and that it stood on its own as a complete
document. Second, the draft policies were discussed at length in many contexts. Early in the process a one month
meeting of all senior officials in the Ministry of Education took place outside the capital city. Then, after copies of
the draft had been submitted to the political councils at the district level, a national consultative conference for all
district and national education officials was held. This was followed by a consultative conference with representatives of various women’s organizations, and finally by an extended debate in parliament.
This unusual White Paper process also reflects the tensions between the established educational leadership (of
what had been a good educational system in the 1960s) and the revolutionary political leadership of the new
government. The membership of the original Commission was dominated by well-respected senior educators from
before the revolution. The revolutionary government used the White Paper process to insure that its ideological
goals were met and that the resulting document had the full support of its political organizations. A further consequence of the lengthy White Paper process was the preempting of the government process by funding agencies who
went ahead with the implementation of selected reforms. The result was a de facto setting of priorities for certain
educational activities by initiative of the funding agencies.

While progress has been made in this area, there are no sure answers. Both funding agencies and
government need to recognize that reconciliation of policy goals and financial capability will be a process
of successive approximation. Nevertheless, estimates should be made and incorporated into the dialogue.

How is a legal basis for implementing the policy created?
➤ Passing laws is likely to bring new stakeholders into a debate that may, thereby,
become increasingly political.
➤ The greater the understanding and support for the policies generated during the
formation process, the better the chances of success.
➤ Strong leadership is needed.
The procedures for converting policy statements into legally approved instruments are specific
to each country. To move from policy proposals to implementation require one or more of the following:
approval by cabinet, issuing government circulars, promulgation of presidential decrees, or passage of
enabling legislation by parliament. At each step of the process, further dialogue and refinement will take
place. Sometimes policies previously approved are rejected, or options which were rejected earlier in the
process are revived, or controversial policies are sent back for more study. Depending on the context,
these steps will bring other stakeholders into the debate, or provide new opportunities for both advocates
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Box 6: Dealing with Controversial Issues—National Language Policy
Policy regarding the language of instruction in schools is a matter of some controversy in Mauritius, a small island
state which has no indigenous group and is highly multi-ethnic—Indian, African, European and Chinese. Language policy was raised as an issue in the working group for the Master Plan, but it generated strong opposition
from those who felt that the issue had been discussed at length for decades with no resolution, and that no resolution was likely in the education plan either. Current policy has most children studying three languages in school,
none of them the Creole vernacular, with the consequence that a very large part of the primary curriculum is
devoted to language learning. National culture in Mauritius values compromise and consensus. This took precedence over the technical and pedagogical aspects of the debate. The Master Plan, in the end, did not discuss
language policy, but recommended a study on the teaching of languages in primary schools. Subsequently, a
Parliamentary Select Committee proposed that performance in Asian languages on the primary school examination
count toward the ranking of pupils used to determine entry into secondary education. This proposal produced
strong reactions that broke along communal lines with opposition centered in the African and European communities. Failure of the Master Plan to address the issue was a conscious, pragmatic decision which recognized the
potential harm that could result.
The Ugandan Education Commission of 1987 was charged with making a recommendation on language policy in
the schools, but the commission felt the issue was highly political and should not have been in their terms of
reference. Ultimately, they recommended that local languages and Swahili be taught in the schools as subjects, and
referred the matter for further study. During the long period when the Commission report was being digested by
government, a fierce debate took place outside of public view between those in the National Resistance Movement
(NRM) who felt strongly about the use of Swahili as one component in the construction of a new Uganda, and
professional educators concerned about the proficiency in English needed for the higher levels of education and
other effects on learning. The White Paper, when it was finally issued, devoted a long section to the importance of
Swahili as an essential component of NRM strategy to unify the country and promote development. Their revised
recommendations went much further: Swahili and English were to be taught as compulsory subjects to all children
throughout both the primary and the secondary cycle of education. In addition they recommended a series of
promotional and developmental activities all aimed at hastening the day when Swahili would be both a national
language and the medium of instruction. In the end, the White Paper passes the decision to the Constitutional
Commission for final resolution, but makes very clear what outcome it supports. Ultimately the cabinet, recognizing that the language issue was politically volatile and potentially damaging, referred it to committee for further
study.

and opponents of policies to use their power to obtain modifications favorable to them. If legislative
action is needed, public debate may provide opportunities for new constituencies to make their inputs
into the process. In each new venue, different criteria are used to judge the tradeoffs between costs and
benefits of a policy, and may result in changes in the policy. Policies which were supported primarily on
technical grounds will get evaluated on the basis of a social or political calculus. The issue of language
policy provides a good example in many countries of the tradeoffs between the ideological goals of a
national movement trying to create a new national consensus, and the political constraints imposed by
the potential for instability inherent in such a volatile policy issue (see Box 6).
Moving the policy process forward through legal channels requires strong leadership within the
government. The Minister of Education, or in some cases a strong, well-placed civil servant such as the
Permanent Secretary or group of senior civil servants, needs to take the initiative by pushing the process
along, getting the policy statement on the agenda and moving it toward formal approval. Delays in this
process are often caused by conflict surrounding unresolved issues, or opposition to part of the policy by
a key official who either was not consulted earlier, or who is representing a constituency with vested
interests. Completing the policy approval process may require mobilization of outside support to put
pressure on the government for action. The greater the understanding and support generated during the
formation process, the better are the chances are of favorable action.
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What are strategies for building a supportive climate for implementation?
➤ A social learning process is needed that builds understanding of the issues and
support for policies; mass media can be useful for this.
➤ Stakeholder involvement and expression can have long-term benefits and improve
the probability of successful policy implementation.
➤ It is best to plant the seeds of stakeholder involvement early in the policy formation
process.

The case studies provide support for the idea that stakeholder expression—although it can
sometimes be embarrassing for government—creates, in the longer-run, a climate in which better education
policies can be formulated and implemented. As the Delors Commission Report puts it:
The main parties contributing to the success of educational reforms are, first of all, the local community,
including parents, school heads and teachers; secondly, the public authorities; and thirdly, the international
community. Many past failures have been due to the insufficient involvement of one or more of these
partners. Attempts to impose educational reforms from top down, or from outside, have obviously failed.
The countries where the process has been relatively successful are those that obtained a determined
commitment from local communities, parents and teachers, backed up by continuing dialogue and various
forms of outside financial, technical or professional assistance. It is obvious that the local community plays
a paramount role in any successful reform strategy.24

How much dialogue is possible and its content depends on the social and political context in which it is
occurring. This points to a dual task throughout the policy formation process: (i) assessing and choosing
from among policy options on a technical basis, and (ii) promoting a social learning process which builds
understanding of the issues and support for solutions. Setting the stage for implementation of education
policies is an unusual challenge because of the number and diversity of people who must agree and
cooperate in order for implementation to be effective. The seeds of that collaboration are best planted
early in the process, in many different constituencies, and nursed continually throughout the process.
The many strategies discussed in the case studies form a repertoire of options from which each country
can choose.
The methods used to build support for implementation will depend on what structures are available
in a specific context. In a society with a revolutionary government which has built a network of local and
regional structures, such as the National Resistance Councils in Uganda, the ten-house cell system in
Tanzania, or the system of local councils in Botswana, policies can be disseminated and discussed at all
levels and the results filtered back up to national level leaders. In countries which have developed a
decentralized administrative structure for education, discussion can be organized using the education
bureaucracy. Many countries use national meetings, convened around either general reviews of education
policy, or around more specific issues such as the terms of teacher service or curriculum reform. When
such consultation takes place early in the process, it provides an opportunity to listen to peoples’ perceptions
of the problems and to get their reactions to possible policy options. Later in the process, emphasis will
shift toward building a consensus on the nature of problems and on the way in which specific policy
options can contribute to their solution.
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Education policy documents in many African countries are long, complex statements written in
academic English or French. Their form and length make them expensive to reproduce and difficult to
read—particularly in societies which traditionally communicate more in oral than in written form. Often
they are beyond the comprehension of most citizens. As a result, these documents are available and used
primarily by the most senior government officials, and byfunding agencies and their staffs. One country
tried to promote dialogue around the issues by printing and distributing copies of the White Paper to the
party structure in all districts of the country. But the document was nearly 300 pages long and written in
academic English. In reality only a fraction of those who might have read it could understand it, and
fewer still would actually take the time to do so. If real dialogue and understanding is desired, then a
simplified and clear statement of the main policy recommendations, written in local languages when
applicable, needs to be made available.
The public media—radio and newsprint particularly—are often under-utilized in the process of
building understanding and support for changes in education policies. While education is a constant
topic in the media in most countries—focussing on speeches of education officials, school strikes, or
complaints about specific problems—rarely have governments consciously made use of the media to
promote a dialogue around educational issues. The greater the number of people who need to cooperate
for successful policy change, the greater is the need for extensive consultation, dissemination of
information, and building of support. Sometimes governments are afraid to provide information to the
public in fear of the possible response, but attempting to implement changes by fiat can produce even
more disruptive reactions.

Box 7: Using Media for Policy Consultation

In the early 1980s Botswana embarked on an expansion of the basic education cycle to nine years by creating
separate junior secondary schools. By 1988, significant opposition and widespread misunderstanding of the value
of the system had arisen. In response to this public concern, the Ministry of Education initiated an innovative
approach to policy dialogue called “consultative conferences.” They decided to use video tape as a way to bring the
voices of parents, pupils and communities to the national leaders, and to let the local people listen directly to
discussions among the leadership. The purpose of the process was to develop a common perspective on the problem which the nation was facing.
Using four policy issues—the problem of school leavers, the curriculum, the role of the community, and the need
for education changes—a short video tape was made about each issue. Interviews with key stakeholders like
chiefs, teachers, members of the kgotla (a local council), pupils and parents were videotaped. A tightly edited tenminute tape was produced containing representative sample opinions. Interviews in Setswana had English subtitles, and vice-versa. Each video introduced the issue with powerful visual images. The school leaver video used
images of a long line of school leavers standing in front of the employment bureau in Gaborone as a backdrop for
the opening titles. Then students in the line, officials, and community leaders were interviewed on how they felt.
The videos were used in a series of four consultative conferences. The first conference was for the national
leadership and was opened by the Minister who reminded participants of Botswana’s long-standing tradition of
grassroots policy dialogue rooted in the traditional kgotla. The conference format consisted of small groups who
watched a video, listened to a panel of respondents and then held open discussion. The videos provided a forceful
grounding in reality, compelling the discussion to confront the local realities and limiting escape into general
platitudes. The outcome of the conference was a fifth video tape of selected discussions and the responses of
national leaders. The five tapes were then used in a similar manner in a series of three regional conferences in the
country.
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Where state-society relationships are open enough, a country will benefit by having a variety of
non-governmental organizations which are capable of undertaking policy analysis and carrying on public
discussion of issues. Promotion of public policy dialogue as part of the social learning process can be
furthered through the activities of: research organizations loosely linked to the university; more narrowly
based interest groups; or organizations of concerned citizens having multiple voices able to raise and
debate issues along with the government. In Mozambique policy formation on higher education was
initiated by a council of university officials who began meeting and drafted a proposal for consideration
by government. In other countries there has been a growth of NGOs, some of which have the capacity to
articulate problems of the less-fortunate and to raise educational issues in the media. In his keynote
speech, Mr. Thahane highlighted the importance of building an environment that encourages the
involvement of all parts of society in the support of basic education. He said, “The private sector should
be encouraged to provide higher levels of education and training to complement the public sector. We
must look at education as a national endeavor. The business community has a responsibility—all of us
have a responsibility because of the external benefits that flow from and an education system and from
an educated individual.”

How and why implementation is an integral part of policy formation?
➤ Implementation is policy in practice.
➤ The only way to feed the lessons of implementation into the formation process is
by rigorous assessment, monitoring and evaluation.

Perhaps the single most challenging step in the policy formation process is to take a list of policy
priorities and convert them first into strategies and then into a detailed implementation (or action) plan.
While implementation may not, at first glance, seem to be part of policy formation, in reality it may be
the most critical part of the process—it determines the form policy takes in reality and how it is experienced
in the schools. Some authors argue that implementation should be seen as a series of policy experiments;
others would argue that it is part of a continuous, interactive process of policy refinement. Either way,
implementation is policy in practice—and actions speak louder than words.
Issues in the implementation of education projects was the theme of the 1993 DAE task force
meeting held in Angers, France, where it was pointed out that implementation consists of:
•

Operationalization of policy into a detailed plan with a time line and resources;

•

Assigning responsibility for implementation to specific people and units;

•

Supervision, coordination, and support for the implementation units;

•

Monitoring of implementation progress;

•
•

Identification of problems and corrective measures as needed; and
Periodic review of the adequacy of both policies and implementation.25

Leadership style, sensitivity to political realities, technical competencies, clear priorities, local capacity,
and participation are all important for effective implementation.
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Technical and administrative capacity to produce detailed, costed plans and schedules is crucial
for effective implementation. Creating effective plans requires:
•
•
•

Personnel with the experience and skills to convert prose statements into plans;
Timely access to a national knowledge base which allows them to estimate the size of the task;
and
Cost data to create realistic budgets.

Monitoring progress of implementation—and, therefore, the effectiveness of policy— means
defining useful performance and outcome indicators and finding cost-effective ways of collecting relevant
information. Some of the needed information can come from the annual education statistics exercises.
Other data may have to be specially collected, probably by using small samples of schools, to provide
feedback on progress. The committee charged with overseeing the implementation can use the data to
review both implementation strategies and the content of the policies themselves. Constant adjustment
and refinement will be taking place during the implementation. Instituting some sort of formal evaluation
periodically is also desirable—to the extent that implementation relies on external funding, the funding
agency will probably require evaluations and will fund them.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Drawing on African experience, as reported in the case studies and by participants at the Tours
conference, and on the social science literature on policy formation, this paper has set out a number of
central issues. These issues reflect the challenges faced by all African countries as they address the need
for a coherent set of national educational policies. The discussions at the Tours conference, using the
case studies and the working paper as inputs, developed a more complete understanding of the challenges
of educational policy formation. The results of the conference are summarized in two sets of messages
which are presented below.
The case studies suggested that the policy formation process:
•

Requires a good knowledge base;

•

Depends on strong, stable leadership;

•

Is most effective when it is consultative and participatory;

•

Must include setting realistic priorities and forging compromises between competing goals;

•

Requires effective funding and government-wide collaboration;

•
•

Should generate a social learning process and marketing of the national education vision; and
Is continuous and interactive—even at the stage of implementation.

Using the case studies and the experiences of participants at the Tours Biennial (as developed in
small discussion groups), the following points/lessons emerge as the defining issues for effective policy
formation. They are:
(a)
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(b)

Strong and consistent leadership is essential that:
• delegates authority and trusts subordinates;
• explains goals and reasons and uses public media;
• works openly with all through transparent processes; and
• promotes stability of technical staff to provide continuity.

(c)

Political and technical rationales are present and that:
• political participation is first priority;
• technical work supports and informs political dialogue; and
• political will is essential to overcome resistance of vested interests.

(d)

Broad participation of stakeholders is crucial, including:
• government, parliament, political parties;
• students, parents, teachers; and
• active organizations in civil society.

(e)

Policy formation should be a social learning process implying that:
• consensus and widespread understanding are major goals;
• reasons for changes need to be clear to all;
• those sacrificing immediate benefits understand resulting societal benefits; and
• the Ministry of Education becomes a learning institution.

(f)

Concerning the roles played by Government and funding agencies in policy formation:
• Government must be the leading player;
• Cohesive, prioritized, viable plans empower the government; and
• Funding agencies can learn to be supportive partners in the policy process.

These points reflected a general consensus of the Conference participants. The conference
produced an enhanced awareness of the value of national educational policy and a realization that there
is expertise and experience within Africa that could be drawn upon in the future. This yielded a shared
understanding between funding agencies and governments of their respective roles in formulating
educational policy. The feelings of the participants were summed up in the words of Mme, Diallo Aïcha
Bah, former Minister of Education from Guinea and presently Director of Basic Education at UNESCO,
who stated that “Tours will stay in our memories for a long time because it has marked an important
evolution in the relationship between partners in education in Africa. Let us not forget that the concept
underlying our Association for the Development of African Education is full of meaning, and that both
sides must take on the consequences and obligations.”
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TOPIC
Policy
event/
instrument

BENIN
- Etats Généraux de
l'Education.
-Policy Declaration

Period covered

1989 - 1993

1989 - 1993

1990-91
• Adjustment in early
1980s followed by
strong growth in late
1980s leading to
increased needs for
education.
• Education expenditures increased against
pressures of international organizations
Democratic government since independence (1968) with free
elections &
constitutional guarantees.
- High enrollments
• Literate population
• Excessive drop-outs
alter grade 6
- Inadequate science
teaching •

- Shift in policy from selfreliance to extensive
cooperation with IMF &
World Bank
• Adjustment

Adjustment since 1984
with World Bank/IMF
support

New democratic context
plus popular concern for
education - government
use of education fora for
additional legitimation.

- Populist regime
promoted education reforms as it undertook
adjustment programs.
- Government of action,
not of consultation
- Education system "clinically dead"

Military regime until
1993

• Ecole nouvelle of marxist
regime largely discredited
Educational
context

Annex 1: Overview of Country Papers
GUINEA
MAURITIUS
• Policy declaration
Master Plan (MP) for
- Education sector
Education
Adjustment Program

• State bankruptcy in
1989
• Two adjustment programs over this period
Economic
context

Socio-political
context

GHANA
Full cycle of education
reform, from conception implementation
evaluation
I 985 - present

- Enrollments down, costs
high & quality low

• Very low enrollment
rate.
• Little investment.
- High inequalities,
• Very low primary pupil
unit-cost.

MOZAMBIQUE
Development & redesign of post-independence education
system & policies
2 phases: 1975-87;
1987- present
• Extremely difficult
situation.
- +/-70% of Government financing front
donors.
• Poorest country in
Africa
• IMF/World Bank
adjustment programs
Under same leadership, country recently
became a multi-party
democracy.
Existing system perceived to be extremely
unsatisfactory, rigid &
poor quality

UGANDA
• Commission: 1987-89
- White Paper (WP):
1989-94
1989 - present
- Almost total economic
collapse in 1986
- Shift in policy from
self-reliance to cooperation with IMF &
World Bank
• Adjustment as of 1988

• Country recently
emerged from long
period of chaos &
decline.
- Vibrant media & new
social organizations
- Long-standing demands for reform.
• Long tradition of
education reviews &
policy making at 10
car intervals.

TOPIC

BENIN
Numerous studies covering entire sector that,
largely, Set scene and
became unavoidable.

GHANA
• Planning exercises
(1987-91).
• Assessment testing
(1992-94).
• No research.

GUINEA
• Studios undertaken
between I 984-88 by
World Bank/Unesco plus
by nationals
• 11 studies during period
of policy preparation.

MAURITIUS
• Studies identifying
factors leading to poor
performance.
• Poor & unsustained
national utilization of
studies produced by
international experts.

MOZAMBIQUE
• Funding agency
driven
• New Govt. taking
initiative.
• National ownership
of some studies is disputed

• Minister aloof from
technical matters.
• Minister forms own
party for 1995 legislative
elections & solicits
support from MoE staff.

• Highly authoritarian
from above.
• Political leadership
highly committed.

• Minister demonstrated
commitment by actively
participating in most
matters, went to the field,
worked closely with
people in various roles,
solved problems, and had
a thorough understanding
of technical issues.
• Stability of minister
(since 6/89) and staff enhanced both’s leadership
capacities.

• Current minister
takes lead role; previous introduced fewer
innovations
• Current minister has
deep knowledge of, &
long experience in,
education sector

• Three ministers since
1989.
• Ministerial changes
accompanied by extensive staff changes.

• 4 ministers & 6 directors-general over period
• Numerous institutional
changes & a fair degree of
institutional instability

• Minister in office since
1989.
• High degree of staff
continuity.

• Activist minister
deeply involved in all
aspects: masters the
details; chairs weekly
staff meetings; set
clear objectives &
stuck to them with
persistence; consults
extensively with all
actors; has relaxed &
open style.
• Minister has excellent relations with
Prime Minister.
• Minister in office
from 1983-95.
• Highly stable: MoE
leadership and related
para-statals in post for
long periods

Knowledge base

Leadership

Continuity (ministerial & higher-level
staff) & Stability

Three ministers since
1975

UGANDA
• Study of other
countries' systems.
• A culture of thorough
analysis (many commissions of inquiry)
• Poor data
• Pre-investment &
sector studies.
• Funding agencies
preponderant
• Strong, participatory
leadership from President & all officials.
• Dynamic & flexible
minister.
• Effective Government
leadership is outgrowth
of popularly supported
guerrilla war followed
by 9 years of stability.

• Minister in office
since 1989; stability
since then, little before.

TOPIC

BENIN
National experts involved
in studies have been promoted to important posi-

GHANA

GUINEA

• Planning, budgeting &

• Stable teams that ac-

monitoring unit established

tions in education and

Capacity
building

Compromises &

related factors

MOZAMBIQUE

UGANDA

National counterparts

• An on-going process

• Planning & imp-

yuircd professional com-

to foreign technical

Technical assistance
required for knowl-

petencies.

assistance was
unavailable in some
areas. This led to

Plementation units
strengthened
• Decentralization to
Districts.
• National experts

planning ministries,

• Decentralization

• Experts worked with,

thereby also promoting
continuity

• Increased responsibilities
for communities

and trained, Mol: professionals.

inadequate use of
technical expertise
provided

Political & educational

• Little compromise in

• Studies & group dis-

Process guided by

consultations - compromises & consensus

beginning.
• Priority setting established from above.
• Accommodation with
critics at later stages.

cussions determined
compromises & priorities

Time pressures not ail
important issue.

Reforms promulgated
rapidly to lake advantage
of perceived "window of
opportunity".

culturally embedded
need for consensus,
which can take
Precedence over
pedagogic matters
• MP took much
longer that foreseen,
but this was reasonable & preferable.
• Funding agencies
respected MP time
constraints

priority setting

Timing & lime-

MAURITIUS

edge transfer

involved in sector
studies and policy
processes.
• Education managers
trained
• Patient negotiations
with funding agencies.
• Extended dialogue
participation

Funding agency timing
not compatible with
that of Government.

• Funding agencies’
Government's timing
out of synch.
• Funding agencies
initiate projects before
end of process.

TOPIC

With
in
MOE

Participation,

consul
tation,

Within
Gov

coordination,
&
marketing

With
civil &
politisociety

BENIN
• Ministerial cabinet plays
preponderant rote.
• Initially, fairly intensive.
• Diffusion outside of major
centers difficult

GHANA
• Little-to-no prior
consultation.
• Dissent not tolerated

GUINEA
• Participation & consenwithin MoE during
formulation phase.
• Autonomous Comité de
pilotage for
implementation met 42
times over .3 years.
• Ateliers de rentrée.

• Relatively weak, given
absence of functioning
committees.
• USAID adjustment
financing only marginally
improved MoE/Min Finance
coordination.

Discussions within inner
circle of military govern

- Several ministries
participated.
• Comité de, suivi met 14,
times over 3 years.

- Relatively weak:
education received some
press attention and rather
little attention from
Parliament.
• Education Law never
passed

Explanatory campaign to
market the reform followed
major decisions.

• Unions closely associated
with elaboration of policy
document (which called for
staff reduction).
• Parents not consulted for
lack of organized structure.
• No broader consultations,
but "open discussions".
• Policy document widely
disseminated.

MAURITIUS
• Statement of
objectiveswas work of
very few people
• Much of Plan drafted
by local technicians
• Seminars with
teachers, managers,
principals, students
others.
• National seminar held
alter publication of first
complete draft; attended
by school of officials
PTAs, unions,
employers, NGOs, ++;
led to revisions.
• Council of Ministers
was responsible for
broad policy and
decisions on major
issues & was generally
supportive of education
development.

MOZAMBIQUE
Initial postindependence system
conceived by a group of
professionals on the
basis of a foreign model.

• Several ministers
participated
• Council of Ministers,
then Parliament,
involved

• Some consultation in
the cities, little in the
rural areas
• Poor infrastructure
hinders communications
outside capital.

UGANDA
• High levels of
participation by
professionals.
• Senior staff involved in
consultative processes.
• Continual guidance by
MOE management &
involvement in
approval process
• Cabinet initiated
process & approved
document
• Officials tram other
ministries participated.
- Parliamentary debate on
final document followed
by
legislation.
• Emphasis on consensus
at ail levels of politics.
• First phase: widest
consultation on education
ever, but still limited to
urban elite.
• Second phase (WP):
bottom-up, consensus
building approach, led by
President,
• Broad consultation
through national local
leaders.
• Problems in circulating
reports.

TOPIC

Funding agencies:
Coordination
roles

Policy
outcomes

Implementation
experience

BENIN
• Little direct coordination: each agency's internal constraints take
precedence over effective
coordination.
• Government refuses to
take lead role.
• Unesco/UNDP financing of policy studies have
coordinating effect.
• USAID put in place
large project for basic
education, based on
policy studies.
• World Bank initiates
sector adjustment process, winds up financing
investment project.

(:MANA
Generous financing for reform from several
agencies (WB, USAID,
ODA, ).

GUINEA
• Agencies participated in
all phases of policy document.
• Weekly meetings at the
initiative of MoE during
implementation, monthly
later.
• Annual program review
meetings.
- Agency coordination
was more difficult during
implementation than
during policy formulation.
• MoE played lead role.

MAURITIUS
- Agencies played
prominent role
- Data identification &
use was their major
contribution,

MOZAMBIQUE
• Agencies' orle is
preponderant
- Coordination is
intensive and coordinated through formal
mechanism

Policy statement adopted
to satisfaction of some
agencies and not others
(who wanted more detail).

Policies adopted.

• The process led to
tangible results that
resulted in rapid development of the education
system over a relatively
short time.
• Results in 199? exceeded 1989 objectives.

MP accepted by
Government & agreed
by agencies

Evaluation of initial
post-independence
system currently
underway

- Experimental programs
to promote girls' enrollments.
- Ministry reorganization
underway, although
timidly.

• Initial critics within
Ministrv were fired and
later reintegrated.
• Enrolment rates not
keeping up with populafion growth.
• No improvements in student learning.

• Machinery established for MP implementation
• Action plans prepared & implementing
agencies, identified

• Current situation is
one of "policy ferment"
• On the verge of new
policy directions

MANDA
• Major policy segments developed outside of WP process,
with funding agency
influence dominant.
- Agencies show little
interest in govt. priorilies (UPE & vocational
education).
• Lack of MoE action
made it necessary for
funding agencies, to be
guided by their own
agendas.
- Local & MoF officials
unprepared to negotiate
with funding agencies
& coordinate their
projects.
- Consensus on contentious issues
• Shift of emphasis from
access to quality as
result of agency
influence.
- Early signs of improved learners' performance & overall
standards.
- Partially driven by
funding agencies'
preferences,
• Early implementation
limited to policies
supported by funding
agencies

TOPIC

Funding agencies:
Coordination
&
roles

Policy
outcomes

Implementation
experience

BENIN
• Little direct coordination: each agency's internal constraints take
precedence over effective
coordination.
• Government refuses to
take lead role.
• Unesco/UNDP financing of policy studies have
coordinating effect.
• USAID put in place
large project for basic
education, based on
policy studies.
• World Bank initiates
sector adjustment process, winds up financing
investment project.

(:MANA
Generous financing for reform from several
agencies (WB, USAID,
ODA, ).

GUINEA
• Agencies participated in
all phases of policy
document.
• Weekly meetings at the
initiative of MoE during
implementation, monthly
later.
• Annual program review
meetings.
- Agency coordination
was more difficult during
implementation than
during policy formulation.
• MoE played lead role.

MAURITIUS
- Agencies played
prominent role
- Data identification &
use was their major
contribution,

MOZAMBIQUE
• Agencies' role is
preponderant
- Coordination is
intensive and
coordinated through
formal
mechanism

Policy statement adopted
to satisfaction of some
agencies and not others
(who wanted more detail).

Policies adopted.

• The process led to
tangible results that
resulted in rapid
development of the
education
system over a relatively
short time.
• Results in 199? exceeded 1989 objectives.

MP accepted by
Government & agreed
by agencies

Evaluation of initial
post-independence
system currently
underway

- Experimental programs
to promote girls'
enrollments.
- Ministry reorganization
underway, although
timidly.

• Initial critics within
Ministrv were fired and
later reintegrated.
• Enrolment rates not
keeping up with population
growth.
• No improvements in
student learning.

• Machinery established
for MP implementation
• Action plans prepared & implementing
agencies, identified

• Current situation is
one of "policy ferment"
• On the verge of new
policy directions

MANDA
• Major policy segments
developed outside of WP process,
with funding agency
influence dominant.
- Agencies show little
interest in govt. priorities
(UPE & vocational
education).
• Lack of MoE action
made it necessary for
funding agencies, to be
guided by their own
agendas.
- Local & MoF officials
unprepared to negotiate
with funding agencies
& coordinate their
projects.
- Consensus on
contentious issues
• Shift of emphasis from
access to quality as
result of agency
influence.
- Early signs of improved
learners' performance &
overall
standards.
- Partially driven by
funding agencies'
preferences,
• Early implementation
limited to policies
supported by funding
agencies

FORMULATING EDUCATION POLICY: LESSONS AND EXPERIENCE FROM SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Craig, John. (1990) Comparative African experiences in implementing educational policies. World Bank Discussion
Papers No. 83. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
Condé, Alamah. (1995) The redeployment of teachers in Guinea. Paris: Association for the Development of
African Education (DAE).
Crouch, Luis, et. al. (1993) Policy dialogue and reform in the education sector. Advocacy Series No. 3. Education
and Human Resources Technical Services. Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean. Washington,
D.C.: USAID.
Delors, Jacques, et. al. (1996) Learning: The Treasure Within—Report to UNESCO of the International Commission
on Education for the Twenty-first Century. Paris: UNESCO Publishing.
Donors to African Education. (1994a) Issues in the Implementation of Education Sector Programs and Projects in
sub-Saharan Africa, with reflections from the DAE Task Force Meetings, October 1993—Angers, France.
Paris: Donors to African Education.
Donors to African Education. (1994b) Improving the implementation of education projects in Africa through
ownership: Proceedings of the DAE Task Force Meetings, Angers, France, 22-24 October 1993. Paris:
Donors to African Education.
Evans, David R. (ed.) (1994) Education policy formation in Africa: A comparative study of five countries. Technical
Paper No. 12. Office of Analysis, Research, and Technical Support, Bureau for Africa. Washington, D.C.:
USAID.
Feldman, M. S. (1989) Order without design: information production and policy making. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.
Fuller, Bruce & Habte, Aklilu (eds.) (1992) Adjusting educational policies: conserving resources while raising
school quality. World Bank Discussion Papers No. 132. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
Grindle, M. S. & Thomas, J. W. (1991) Public choices and policy change: the political economy of reform in
developing countries. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Haddad, Wadi, D. & Demsky, T. (1994) The dynamics of education policymaking. EDI Development Policy Case
Series, Analytical Case Studies, No. 10. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
Haddad, Wadi D. (1995) Education policy-planning process: an applied framework. Fundamentals of Educational
Planning, No. 51. Paris: UNESCO: International Institute for Educational Planning.
Lindblom, C. E. & Woodhouse, E. J. (1993) The policy·making process. Third Edition. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice Hall.
Pressman, J. L. & Wildavsky, A. (1984) Implementation. Berkeley, CA., USA: University of California Press.
Rondinelli, Dennis. (1990) Planning Education Reforms in Developing Countries. Durham, NC:
Duke University.
Porter, Robert W. & Hicks, I. (1995) Knowledge Utilization and the process of policy formation: toward a framework
for Africa. Prepared for USAID supported SARA Project. Washington, D.C.: Academy for Educational
Development.

3 6

OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE CASE STUDIES

Samoff, Joel (ed.). (1994) Coping with crisis: Austerity, Adjustment and Human Resources. London, New York &
Paris: Cassell & UNESCO.
Sack, Richard. (1981) “A typology of educational reforms.” Prospects 21(1), 39-53.
Sack, Richard. (1994) “Quelle éducation pour quel développement ?” Afrique contemporaine. 172, 68-74.
Sack, Richard. (1995) Donor coordination at the country level: Experience from an “upstream” education policy
analysis project & conceptual explorations. Paris: UNESCO (BER/PSA).
Senge, Peter M. (1990) The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization. New York:
Currency Doubleday.
Simon, Herbert A. (1957) Models of Man. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Sutherland Addy, Esi. (1993) Revival and Renewal: Reflections on the Creation of a System of Tertiary Education
in Ghana. Technical Note No. 10, AFTHR. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
Weiler, Hans. (1983) “Legalization, expertise, and participation: Strategies of compensatory legitimation in
educational policy.” Comparative Education Review, 27(2), 259-277.
White, Louise G. (1990) Implementing policy reforms in LDCs. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

3 7

